

10,000 flight cycles on the lower forward corner reveal, do the detailed inspection for cracking specified in paragraph (j) of this AD and inspect thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 flight cycles, until a new or reworked two-piece reveal is installed in accordance with Part 2 of the service bulletin. No further action is required by this paragraph for that location only after the replacement.

(2) If no cracking is found but a sharp edge is found, do the action specified in paragraph (j)(2)(i) or (j)(2)(ii) of this AD.

(i) Before further flight, replace the lower forward corner reveal with a new or reworked two-piece reveal, in accordance with Part 2 of the service bulletin. No further action is required by this paragraph for that location only after the replacement.

(ii) Before further flight, replace the reveal with a new or reworked one-piece machined aluminum reveal without a sharp edge, in accordance with Part 3 of the service bulletin. Within 10,000 flight cycles after doing the replacement, do the actions specified in paragraph (j) of this AD, except for the inspection for a sharp edge.

(3) If cracking is found, do the action specified in paragraph (j)(3)(i) or (j)(3)(ii) of this AD.

(i) Before further flight, replace the reveal with a new or reworked two-piece reveal, in accordance with Part 2 of the service bulletin. No further action is required by this paragraph for that location only after the replacement.

(ii) Before further flight, replace the lower forward corner reveal with a new or reworked one-piece machined aluminum reveal without a sharp edge, in accordance with Part 3 of the service bulletin. Within 10,000 flight cycles after doing the replacement, do the actions specified in paragraph (j) of this AD, except for the inspection for a sharp edge.

#### **Actions for Group 1, Configuration 1 Airplanes**

(k) For airplanes identified as Group 1, Configuration 1 airplanes in the service bulletin: Before the accumulation of 1,500 total flight cycles, or within 1,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, do a material type inspection to determine if the lower forward corner reveals are castings, in accordance with the service bulletin.

(1) If the forward corner reveal is not a casting: Before further flight, do the actions specified in paragraph (j) of this AD, except for the inspection for a sharp edge.

(2) If the forward corner reveal is a casting: Before the accumulation of 7,000 total flight cycles, within 2,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, or within 3,000 flight cycles since the forward corner reveal was inspected in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53A2378, whichever is later, do a detailed inspection for cracking of the lower forward corner reveal, in accordance with Part 1 of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 747-53-2460, Revision 1, dated February 13, 2007.

(i) If no cracking is found: Repeat the inspection specified in paragraph (k)(2) of this AD thereafter at intervals not to exceed

3,000 flight cycles until a new or reworked two-piece lower forward corner reveal is installed in accordance with Part 2 of the service bulletin. No further action is required by this paragraph for that location only after the replacement.

(ii) If cracking is found: Do the actions specified in paragraph (k)(2)(ii)(A), (k)(2)(ii)(B), or (k)(2)(ii)(C) of this AD.

(A) Before further flight, weld repair the reveal in accordance with Part 4 of the service bulletin. Repeat the inspection specified in paragraph (k)(2) of this AD thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight cycles until a new or reworked two-piece reveal is installed in accordance with Part 2 of the service bulletin.

(B) Before further flight, replace the reveal with a new or reworked two-piece reveal, in accordance with Part 2 of the service bulletin. No further action is required by this paragraph for that location only after the replacement.

(C) Before further flight, replace the reveal with a new or reworked one-piece machined aluminum reveal without a sharp edge, in accordance with Part 3 of the service bulletin. Within 10,000 flight cycles after doing the replacement, do the actions specified in paragraph (j) of this AD, except for the inspection for a sharp edge.

#### **Operator's Equivalent Procedure**

(l) Although Step 5 of Figure 8 of the service bulletin specifies that operators may accomplish the actions in accordance with "an operator's equivalent procedure," this AD requires operators to accomplish Step 5 of Figure 8 in accordance with only the procedures specified in Boeing Standard Overhaul Practices Manual (SOPM) 20-20-02 as given in the service bulletin. An "operator's equivalent procedure" may be used only if approved as an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (p) of this AD.

#### **Compliance With AD 2007-12-11 for MED 3 Only**

(m) Accomplishment of the applicable repair required by this AD constitutes compliance with the repair of the lower forward corner casting (reveal) of the number 3 MEDs only, as required by paragraph (q)(2)(ii) of AD 2007-12-11 (which specifies the actions be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53A2378, Revision 1, dated March 10, 1994; or Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53A2378, Revision 3, dated August 11, 2005). Accomplishment of the actions of this AD does not terminate the remaining requirements of AD 2007-12-11.

#### **Parts Installation**

(n) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install a door lower forward corner reveal made of cast 356 aluminum on any airplane at a location specified by this AD.

(o) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install a door lower forward corner reveal made of machined 6061 aluminum on any airplane at a location specified by this AD, unless it has been confirmed/reworked to be without a sharp edge in accordance with the service bulletin.

#### **Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)**

(p)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair required by this AD, if it is approved by an Authorized Representative for the Boeing Commercial Airplanes Delegation Option Authorization Organization who has been authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to make those findings. For a repair method to be approved, the repair must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 10, 2007.

**Ali Bahrami,**

*Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E7-18420 Filed 9-18-07; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## **DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION**

### **Federal Aviation Administration**

#### **14 CFR Part 39**

**[Docket No. FAA-2007-29248; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-155-AD]**

**RIN 2120-AA64**

#### **Airworthiness Directives; Saab Model SAAB-Fairchild SF340A (SAAB/SF340A) and SAAB 340B Airplanes**

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight \* \* \* and on ground, \* \* \* Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) \* \* \* required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System \* \* \*.

\* \* \* \* \*

Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an 'unsafe condition' \* \* \*. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements.

The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by October 19, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *DOT Docket Web Site:* Go to <http://dms.dot.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.

- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

- *Hand Delivery:* Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://dms.dot.gov>; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mike Borfritz, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2677; fax (425) 227-1149.

### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the

**ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2007-29248; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-155-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,

economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://dms.dot.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2006-0221, dated July 20, 2006 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight \* \* \* and on ground, the FAA published Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR 88) in June 2001. SFAR 88 required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System to determine that the design meets the requirements of FAR (Federal Aviation Regulation) § 25.901 and § 25.981(a) and (b).

A similar regulation has been recommended by the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) to the European National Aviation Authorities in JAA letter 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of 3 February 2003. The review was requested to be mandated by NAA's (National Aviation Authorities) using JAR (Joint Aviation Regulation) § 25.901(c), § 25.1309.

In August 2005 EASA published a policy statement on the process for developing instructions for maintenance and inspection of Fuel Tank System ignition source prevention (EASA D 2005/CPRO, [http://www.easa.eu.int/home/cert\\_policy\\_statements\\_en.html](http://www.easa.eu.int/home/cert_policy_statements_en.html)) that also included the EASA expectations with regard to compliance times of the corrective actions on the unsafe and the not unsafe part of the harmonised design review results. On a global scale the TC (type certificate) holders committed themselves to the EASA published compliance dates (see EASA policy statement). The EASA policy statement has been revised in March 2006: The date of 31-12-2005 for the unsafe related actions has now been set at 01-07-2006.

Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an 'unsafe condition' as defined in FAA's memo 2003-112-15 'SFAR 88—Mandatory Action Decision Criteria'. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements.

This EASA Airworthiness Directive mandates the Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations (comprising maintenance/

inspection tasks and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL)) for the type of aircraft, that resulted from the design reviews and the JAA recommendation and EASA policy statement mentioned above.

The corrective action is revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new limitations for fuel tank systems. You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled "Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements" (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 ("SFAR 88," Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken

that may mitigate the need for further action.

The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued a regulation that is similar to SFAR 88. (The JAA is an associated body of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation regulatory authorities of a number of European States who have agreed to co-operate in developing and implementing common safety regulatory standards and procedures.) Under this regulation, the JAA stated that all members of the ECAC that hold type certificates for transport category airplanes are required to conduct a design review against explosion risks.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

#### Relevant Service Information

Saab has issued Saab 340 Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Document 340 LKS 009033, dated February 14, 2006. The actions described in this service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

#### FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

#### Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are

highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.

#### Costs of Compliance

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 144 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 1 work-hour per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is \$80 per work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be \$11,520, or \$80 per product.

#### Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

#### Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

#### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

#### The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

#### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

**SAAB Aircraft AB:** Docket No. FAA-2007-29248; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-155-AD.

#### Comments Due Date

- (a) We must receive comments by October 19, 2007.

#### Affected ADs

- (b) None.

#### Applicability

- (c) This AD applies to all Saab Model SAAB-Fairchild SF340A (SAAB/SF340A) and SAAB 340B airplanes, certificated in any category, all serial numbers.

**Note 1:** This AD requires revisions to certain operator maintenance documents to include new inspections. Compliance with these inspections is required by 14 CFR 91.403(c). For airplanes that have been previously modified, altered, or repaired in the areas addressed by these inspections, the operator may not be able to accomplish the inspections described in the revisions. In this situation, to comply with 14 CFR 91.403(c), the operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance according to paragraph (g) of this AD. The request should include a description of changes to the required inspections that will ensure the continued operational safety of the airplane.

#### Subject

- (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28: Fuel.

#### Reason

- (e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight \* \* \* and on ground, the FAA published Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR 88) in June 2001. SFAR 88 required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System to determine that the design meets the requirements of FAR (Federal Aviation Regulation) § 25.901 and § 25.981(a) and (b).

A similar regulation has been recommended by the JAA (Joint Aviation Authorities) to the European National Aviation Authorities in JAA letter 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of 3 February 2003. The review

was requested to be mandated by NAA's (National Aviation Authorities) using JAR (Joint Aviation Regulation) § 25.901(c), § 25.1309.

In August 2005 EASA published a policy statement on the process for developing instructions for maintenance and inspection of Fuel Tank System ignition source prevention (EASA D 2005/CPRO, [http://www.easa.eu.int/home/cert\\_policy\\_statements\\_en.html](http://www.easa.eu.int/home/cert_policy_statements_en.html)) that also included the EASA expectations with regard to compliance times of the corrective actions on the unsafe and the not unsafe part of the harmonised design review results. On a global scale the TC (type certificate) holders committed themselves to the EASA published compliance dates (see EASA policy statement). The EASA policy statement has been revised in March 2006: The date of 31–12–2005 for the unsafe related actions has now been set at 01–07–2006.

Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an "unsafe condition" as defined in FAA's memo 2003–112–15 "SFAR 88—Mandatory Action Decision Criteria". These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements.

This EASA Airworthiness Directive mandates the Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations (comprising maintenance/inspection tasks and Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL)) for the type of aircraft, that resulted from the design reviews and the JAA recommendation and EASA policy statement mentioned above.

The corrective action is revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new limitations for fuel tank systems.

#### Actions and Compliance

(f) Unless already done, do the following actions.

(1) Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD, revise the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate the maintenance and inspection instructions in Part 1 of Saab 340 Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Document 340 LKS 009033, dated February 14, 2006. For all tasks identified in Part 1 of Saab 340 Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Document 340 LKS 009033, dated February 14, 2006, the initial compliance times start from the effective date of this AD, and the repetitive inspections must be accomplished thereafter at the interval specified in Part 1 of Saab 340 Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Document 340 LKS 009033, dated February 14, 2006.

(2) Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, revise the ALS of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate the CDCCLs as defined in Part 2 of Saab 340 Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Document 340 LKS 009033, dated February 14, 2006.

(3) Except as provided by paragraph (g) of this AD: After accomplishing the actions

specified in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this AD, no alternative inspection, inspection intervals, or CDCCLs may be used.

(4) Where Saab 340 Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Document 340 LKS 009033, dated February 14, 2006, allows for exceptional short-term extensions, an exception is acceptable to the FAA if it is approved by the appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding District Office.

#### FAA AD Differences

**Note 2:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

#### Other FAA AD Provisions

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Mike Borfritz, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2677; fax (425) 227–1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120–0056.

#### Related Information

(h) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Airworthiness Directive 2006–0221, dated July 20, 2006, and Saab 340 Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Document 340 LKS 009033, dated February 14, 2006, for related information.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 10, 2007.

**Ali Bahrami,**

*Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. E7–18478 Filed 9–18–07; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910–13–P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 153

[Docket No. FAA–2007–29237]

RIN 2120–AJ07

#### Aviation Safety Inspector Airport Access

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** Two rulemakings finalized several years ago removed regulatory language that implemented FAA Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI) statutory authority to access air operations areas, secured areas, and security identification display areas. This proposal reiterates and clarifies the authority of an ASI with the proper credentials to access air operations areas, secured areas, and security identification areas of an airport. The proposal would make sure ASIs have access to these areas of an airport so they can perform official duties in support of the FAA's safety mission.

**DATES:** Send your comments on or before October 19, 2007.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments identified by Docket Number FAA–2007–29237 by any of the following methods:

- **DOT Docket Web site:** Go to <http://dms.dot.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- **Government-wide rulemaking Web site:** Go to <http://www.regulations.gov> and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.

- **Mail:** Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–001.

- **Fax:** 1–202–493–2251.

- **Hand Delivery:** Room PL–401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

You may also read background documents or comments received at the addresses above.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Pat Hempen, Federal Aviation Administration, Flight Standards Service, Air Transportation Division (AFS–200), 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; Telephone 202–267–8166, E-mail [patrick.hempen@faa.gov](mailto:patrick.hempen@faa.gov).