application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the **Federal Register**.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 31, 2019.

No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50–390 and 50–391, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Rhea County, Tennessee

Date of amendment request: December 20, 2017, as supplemented by letters dated February 15, April 9, and October 4, 2018.

Brief description of amendments: The amendments revised Technical Specification (TS) 4.2.1, "Fuel Assemblies," for Unit 2 to allow up to 1,792 tritium producing burnable absorber rods in the reactor; and revised the Units 1 and 2 TSs related to fuel storage.

Date of issuance: May 22, 2019. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented prior to startup from the outage where any number of tritium producing burnable absorber rods is inserted in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, reactor core not to exceed December 31, 2022.

Amendment Nos.: 125 (Unit 1) and 27 (Unit 2). A publicly available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML18347B330; documents related to these amendments are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendments.

Facility Operating License Nos. NPF– 90 and NPF–96: The amendments revised the Facility Operating Licenses and TSs.

Date of initial notice in **Federal Register**: June 8, 2018 (83 FR 26709). The supplement dated October 4, 2018, provided additional information that clarified the application, and did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed in the **Federal Register**.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated May 22, 2019.

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation, Docket No. 50–482, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1 (Wolf Creek), Coffey County, Kansas

Date of amendment request: January 17, 2017, as supplemented by letters dated March 22, May 4, July 13, October 18, and November 14, 2017; January 15, January 29, April 19, June 19, August 9, November 15 (two letters), and December 6, 2018; and March 5, May 2, and May 15, 2019.

Brief description of amendment: The amendment revised the Wolf Creek Technical Specifications to replace the existing methodology for performing core design, non-loss-of-coolantaccident and loss-of-coolant accident safety analyses with standard Westinghouse Electric Corporation developed and NRC-approved analysis methodologies. In addition, the amendment revised the Wolf Creek licensing basis by adopting the alternative source term (AST) radiological analysis methodology in accordance with 10 CFR 50.67, "Accident source term." This amendment represented a full scope implementation of the AST as described in Regulatory Guide 1.183, "Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors."

Date of issuance: May 31, 2019. Effective date: As of the date of issuance and shall be implemented during startup (prior to entry into Mode 2) from Refueling Outage 23.

Amendment No.: 221. A publicly available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML19100A122; documents related to this amendment are listed in the Safety Evaluation enclosed with the amendment.

Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-42. The amendment revised the Renewed Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications.

Date of initial notice in **Federal** Register: On July 5, 2017, the NRC staff published a proposed no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination in the Federal Register (82 FR 31084) for the proposed amendment. Subsequently by letters dated July 13, October 18, and November 14, 2017; January 15, January 29, April 19, June 19, and August 9, 2018, the licensee provided additional information that expanded the scope of the amendment request as originally noticed in the Federal Register. Accordingly, the NRC published a second proposed NSHC determination in the Federal Register on October 2, 2018 (83 FR 49590), which superseded the original notice in its entirety. The supplemental letters dated November 15 (two letters) and December 6, 2018; and March 5, May 2, and May 15, 2019, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as noticed on October 2, 2018, and did not change the NRC staff's proposed NSHC determination published in the Federal Register dated October 2, 2018.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a

Safety Evaluation dated May 31, 2019. No significant hazards consideration comments received: No.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day of June 2019.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Craig G. Erlanger,

Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 2019–12573 Filed 6–17–19; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-219; NRC-2019-0096]

Exelon Generation Company LLC; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reissued exemptions originally approved on October 16, 2018, exempting Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or the licensee) from certain emergency planning (EP) requirements. The NRC is reissuing these exemptions to change the effective date of the exemptions from date would change from 365 days to 285 days after the permanent cessation of power operations. The reissued exemptions eliminated the requirements to maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek), based on the reduced risks of accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a decommissioning nuclear power reactor.

DATES: The exemptions were reissued on June 11, 2019.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2019–0096 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this document using any of the following methods:

• Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2019-0096. Address questions about NRC docket IDs in Regulations.gov to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301-287-9127; email: Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed

in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document.

• NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ adams.html. To begin the search, select "Begin Web-based ADAMS Search." For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@ nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this document. In addition, for the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS accession numbers are provided in a table in the "Availability of Documents" section of this document.

• *NRC's PDR:* You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Amy M. Snyder, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–6822; email: *Amy.Snyder@ nrc.gov.*

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

The Commission has determined that, pursuant to section 50.12 of title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (CFR), Exelon's request for exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, and as summarized in Enclosure 2 to SECY– 18–0062, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Exelon's exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's safety evaluation associated with this exemption. The exemptions are effective as of 285 days after permanent cessation of power operations.

II. Availability of Documents

The documents identified in the following table are available for public inspection through ADAMS, a public web page, or by using one of the methods discussed in the **ADDRESSES** section of this document.

Document title	Date	ADAMS accession No. or public web page
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Certification of Permanent Cessation of Power Operations for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.".	February 14, 2018	ML18045A084.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Certification of Permanent Removal of Fuel from the Reactor Vessel for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.".	September 25, 2018	ML18268A258.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Li- cense Amendment Request—Proposed Change of Effective and Implementation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Perma- nently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme.".	October 22, 2018	ML18295A384.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Li- cense Amendment Request Supplement—Proposed Change of Effective and Imple- mentation Dates of License Amendment No. 294, Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme.".	November 6, 2018	ML18310A306.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) and Supplemental Information Regarding Request for Changing Emergency Preparedness License Amendment No. 294 Effective Date".	February 13, 2019	ML19044A643.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-6451, "A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants.".	August 1997	ML082260098.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1738, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants.".	February 2001	ML010430066.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, "Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans," Version 2.0.	November 2010	http://www.fema.gov/pdf/ about/divisions/npd/CPG_ 101 V2.pdf.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG–2161, "Consequence Study of a Be- yond Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boil- ing Water Reactor.".	September 2014	ML14255A365.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, COMSECY-13-0030, "Staff Evaluation and Recommendation for Japan Lessons-Learned Tier 3 Issue on Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel.".	November 12, 2013	ML13329A918 (Package)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, SECY-18-0062, "Request by the Exelon Gen- eration Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Require- ments for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.".	May 31, 2018	ML18030B340 (Package).
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Staff Requirements—SECY-18-0062, Request by the Exelon Generation Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.".	July 17, 2018	ML18198A449.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Supplement to Request for Exemption from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50 part 50, Appendix E.".	March 8, 2018	ML18067A087.
Exelon Generation Company, LLC, letter to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Related to Exemption Re- quest from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50 part 50, Appendix E.".	March 19, 2018	ML18078A146.

Document title	Date	ADAMS accession No. or public web page
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Exelon Generation Company, LLC "Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station—Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements and Related Safety Evaluation.".		ML18220A980.

The text of the exemption is attached.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, on June 13, 2019.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Bruce A. Watson,

Chief, Reactor Decommissioning Branch, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

Attachment–Exemption

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Docket No. 50-219

Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Exemption

I. Background

Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or the licensee) is the holder of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-16 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (Oyster Creek). The license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) now or hereafter in effect. The facility is located in Ocean County, New Jersey.

By letter dated February 14, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18045A084), Exelon submitted a certification to the NRC that it would permanently cease power operations at Oyster Creek no later than October 31, 2018. On September 17, 2018, Exelon permanently ceased power operations at Oyster Creek. By letter dated September 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18268A258), Exelon certified the permanent removal of fuel from the Oyster Creek reactor vessel.

In accordance with Section 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), the license for a power reactor facility no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of fuel into the reactor vessel upon the docketing of the certifications for permanent cessation of operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. The facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (*i.e.*, spent) nuclear fuel. Spent fuel is currently stored onsite in the Oyster Creek spent fuel pool (SFP) and a dry cask independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) at the Oyster Creek facility.

Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated final safety analysis reports (UFSARs) for operating power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems, which could affect the fuel in the reactor core and, in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With the permanent cessation of operations at Oyster Creek and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessel, such accidents are no longer possible. The reactor, reactor coolant system, and supporting systems are no longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of the spent fuel. Therefore, emergency planning (EP) provisions for postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, reactor coolant system, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.

The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, "Emergency plans," and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, "Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities," continue to apply to nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have permanently removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is permanently shutdown and defueled from those for a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning status of the facility, Exelon must obtain exemptions from those EP regulations.

On October 16, 2018, the NRC exempted Exelon from certain EP requirements for Oyster Creek (ADAMS Accession No. ML18220A980). These exemptions eliminated the requirements to maintain an offsite radiological emergency preparedness plan and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities at Oyster Creek, based on the reduced risks of accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at a decommissioning nuclear power reactor. The October 16, 2018, exemptions were to become effective no earlier than 12 months (365 days) after permanent cessation of power operations at Oyster Creek.

II. Request/Action

By letter dated November 6, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18310A306), as supplemented by letter dated February 13, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19044A643), Exelon requested to modify the effective date of the October 16, 2018, exemptions from 12 months (365 days) to 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations. Oyster Creek permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018. Therefore, the revised effective date of the exemptions would be June 29, 2019. To provide a complete record of the NRC staff's review, the NRC is reissuing the October 16, 2018, exemptions to reflect the revised effective date. These reissued exemptions supersede the exemptions issued on October 16, 2018.

III. Discussion

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, "Specific exemptions," the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.

As noted previously, the EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and permanently removed fuel from the reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However, the EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release from credible emergency accident scenarios

is significantly reduced. The reduced risk for any significant offsite radiological release is based on two factors. One factor is the elimination of accidents applicable only to an operating power reactor, resulting in fewer credible accident scenarios. The second factor is the reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory and decay heat production due to radioactive decay. Due to the permanently defueled status of the reactor, no new spent fuel will be added to the SFP and the radionuclides in the current spent fuel will continue to decay as the spent fuel ages. The irradiated fuel will produce less heat due to radioactive decay, increasing the available time to mitigate a loss of water inventory from the SFP. The NRC's NUREG/CR-6451, "A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants," dated August 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098), and the NRC's NUREG–1738, "Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants," dated February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors that are bounded by the assumptions and conditions in the reports, the risk of offsite radiological release is significantly less than for an operating power reactor.

The EP exemptions previously approved for Oyster Creek were based on the licensee's demonstration that: (1) The radiological consequences of design-basis accidents would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of one roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary; and (2) in the highly unlikely event of a beyonddesign-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a Comprehensive Emergency Management Program, or "all-hazards," approach to protect the health and safety of the public.

With respect to design-basis accidents at Oyster Creek, the licensee demonstrated that, as of 33 days after the permanent cessation of operations, the radiological consequences of the only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite radiological release (the fuel handling accident (FHA) in the Auxiliary Building, where the SFP is located) will not exceed the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs to the public beyond the exclusion area boundary. Exelon stated that this analysis remains unchanged. Because the requested effective date of the exemptions is 285 days following permanent cessation of power operations, the 33-day decay period necessary for the FHA dose to decrease within the EPA PAGs remains bounded.

With respect to beyond-design-basis accidents at Oyster Creek, the licensee analyzed a drain down of the SFP water that would effectively impede any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates that at 285 days after permanent cessation of power operations, there would be 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered with all cooling lost until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900 degrees Celsius (°C), the temperature used to assess the potential onset of fission product release. The analysis conservatively assumes that the heat up time starts when the SFP has been completely drained with all cooling lost, although it is likely that site personnel will start to respond to an incident when drain down starts. The analysis also does not consider the period of time from the initiating event causing loss of SFP water inventory until cooling is lost.

The NRC reviewed the licensee's justification for the exemptions, including the modified effective date, against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted 285 days after the permanent cessation of power operations. As discussed above, in October 2018, the NRC staff previously granted Exelon exemptions from the relevant EP requirements, with an effective date of these exemptions being 365 days after the permanent cessation of operations. Subsequently, in November 2018, Exelon requested to change the effective date of these exemptions from 365 days to 285 days. Consequently, the NRC is reissuing the October 2018 exemptions with a revised effective date of 285 days after Oyster Creek has permanently ceased operations.

An assessment of the Exelon EP exemptions originally issued on October 16, 2018, is described in SECY–18– 0062, "Request by the Exelon Generation Company, LLC for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station," dated May 31, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18030B340). The Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY–18–0062, dated July 17, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18198A449).

The NRC staff's detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP exemptions are provided in the NRC staff's safety evaluation associated with the October 16, 2018 exemptions (ADAMS Accession No. ML18220A980). That safety evaluation remains valid as to all aspects of the exemptions other than the revised effective date. The NRC staff's detailed review and technical basis for the modification of the effective date of the exemptions is provided in a separate safety evaluation dated June 11, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19095A873).

In sum, the NRC reviewed the licensee's justification for the requested exemptions, including the modified effective date, against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) will be met, and that the exemptions should be granted 285 days after the permanent cessation of power operations. To provide a complete record of the NRC staff's analysis, the NRC is reissuing the specific EP exemptions with the revised effective date of 285 days after the permanent cessation of power operations.

A. The Exemptions are Authorized by Law

The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV, that would allow Exelon to revise the Oyster Creek Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the facility. The licensee has also requested to modify the effective date for the implementation of the previously approved exemptions from 12 months to 9.38 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined that reissuing the licensee's proposed exemptions, with the modified effective date, will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law.

B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

As stated previously, Exelon provided an analysis showing that the radiological consequences of designbasis accidents will not exceed the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, based on the reduced risk of radiological consequences from design-basis accidents still possible at Oyster Creek 285 days after the plant has permanently ceased power operations, formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans required under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary.

Exelon provided an analysis showing that, as of 33 days after permanent cessation of power operations, the radiological consequences of the only remaining design-basis accident with potential for offsite radiological release (FHA in the Auxiliary Building) will not exceed the limits of the EPA early phase PAGs to the public beyond the exclusion area boundary. Because the requested effective date of the exemption is 285 days following permanent cessation of power operations, the 33-day decay necessary for the FHA dose to decrease within the EPA PAGs remains bounded. Oyster Creek permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018.

In addition, the licensee analyzed beyond-design-basis accidents at Oyster Creek, which would result in a drain down of the SFP water that would effectively impede any decay heat removal. The analysis demonstrates that at 285 days after permanent cessation of power operations, there would be 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered until the limiting fuel assembly (for decay heat and adiabatic heatup analysis) reaches 900 °C, the temperature used to assess the potential onset of fission product release.

Exelon has demonstrated that sufficient time continues to exist to implement prompt SFP mitigative action, and if warranted, for offsite governmental officials to implement measures to protect the public using a CEMP, or "all-hazards," approach. As such, the determination that formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans required under 10 CFR part 50 will no longer be needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary remains valid.

Further, NUREG–1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 conclude that the event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to operating power reactors, where typically a large number of different sequences make significant contributions to risk. As described in NUREG-1738, relaxation of offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 beyond a few months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk is low and because even under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness for the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.

Therefore, reissuing the previously approved exemptions with a modified effective date of 9.28 months (285 days) after permanent cessation of power operations will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety.

C. The Exemptions are Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

The reissued exemptions involve EP requirements under 10 CFR part 50 and will allow Exelon to revise the Oyster Creek Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the facility. Physical security measures at Oyster Creek are not affected by the reissued EP exemptions with the revised effective date. The discontinuation of formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite EP activities at Oyster Creek will not adversely affect Exelon's ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the reissued exemptions are consistent with common defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite radiological emergency preparedness plans. The standards and requirements in these regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences.

As previously discussed, because Oyster Creek is permanently shut down and defueled, there is no longer a risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident exceeding EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary and the risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-design-basis accident is greatly reduced when compared to an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at Oyster Creek by comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site-specific conditions at Oyster Creek and determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented at Oyster Creek. As indicated by the results of the research conducted for NUREG-1738, and more recently for NUREG-2161, "Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor," dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14255A365), while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements were relaxed. The licensee's analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, based on an adiabatic heatup analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for decay heat, shows that within 285 days after permanent cessation of power operations, the time for the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 °C is at least 10 hours after the assemblies have been uncovered assuming a loss of all cooling means.

The only analyzed beyond-designbasis accident scenario that progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might occur involves the highly unlikely event where the SFP drains in such a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable, which is referred to as an adiabatic heatup of the spent fuel. The licensee's analysis of this beyonddesign-basis accident shows that within 285 days after permanent cessation of power operations, at least 10 hours would be available between the time that all cooling means are lost to the fuel (at which time adiabatic heatup is conservatively assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 900 °C, which is the temperature associated with rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release. This analysis conservatively does not include the period of time from the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost

The NRC staff has verified Exelon's analyses and its calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in reissuing the requested exemptions to Exelon, there is no design-basis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA early phase PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In the highly unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer, there will be over 10 hours available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to occur under this highly unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP, or "all-hazards," approach to protect the health and safety of the public.

Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with Exelon's requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled facilities.

Additionally, Oyster Creek committed to maintaining SFP makeup strategies in its letters to the NRC dated March 8 and 19, 2018 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML18067A087 and ML18078A146, respectively). The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: Using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on the fire protection system with redundant pumps (one dieseldriven and one electric motor-driven); and onsite diesel fire truck that can take suction from the Barnegat Bay. These strategies will continue to be required as condition 2.C.(8), "Mitigation Strategy License Condition," of renewed facility operating license DPR-16 for Oyster Creek. Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide multiple methods to obtain additional makeup or spray to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release.

For all of the reasons stated above, the NRC staff finds that the licensee's requested exemptions, including the modified effective date, meet the underlying purpose of all of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, and satisfy the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly reduced risk of offsite radiological consequences associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled state of the Oyster Creek facility 285 days after permanent cessation of power operations.

The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at Oyster Creek and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that adequate offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and local government agencies using a CEMP, or "allhazards," approach in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at Oyster Creek. Because the underlying purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans and the reduction in the scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at Oyster Creek, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined that the reissuing the EP exemptions with a revised effective date will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. The NRC staff previously analyzed the October 16, 2018, EP exemptions in a Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental Assessment published in the **Federal Register** on August 13, 2018 (83 FR 40092). That evaluation remains valid as to all aspects of the EP exemptions other than the revised effective date. The NRC staff analyzed the environmental impacts of the revised effective date in a separate Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental Assessment published in the **Federal Register** on May 1, 2019 (84 FR 18586).

IV. Conclusions

Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, reissuing the specific EP exemptions originally granted on October 16, 2018, with the revised effective date of 285 days after permanent cessation of operations will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety and is consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby reissues Exelon's exemption from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the NRC staff's safety evaluation associated with these exemptions. Oyster Creek permanently ceased power operations on September 17, 2018. Therefore, the revised effective date of the reissued exemptions is June 29, 2019.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of June, 2019.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

/RA/

John R. Tappert,

Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Processing. [FR Doc. 2019–12803 Filed 6–17–19; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-219; NRC-2018-0237]

Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC; Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact; issuance.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering issuance of exemptions in response to a November 30, 2018, request from Holtec