appropriateness, accuracy of information, courtesy, efficiency of service delivery, and resolution of issues with service delivery. Responses will be assessed to plan and inform efforts to improve or maintain the quality of service offered to the public. If this information is not collected, vital feedback from customers and stakeholders on the Agency's services will be unavailable.

NSF will only submit a collection for approval under this generic clearance if it meets the following conditions:

- The collection is voluntary;
- The collection is low-burden for respondents (based on considerations of total burden hours, total number of respondents, or burden-hours per respondent) and is low-cost for both the respondents and the Federal Government;
- The collection is non-controversial and does not raise issues of concern to other Federal agencies;
- The collection is targeted to the solicitation of opinions from respondents who have experience with the program or may have experience with the program in the near future;
- Personally identifiable information (PII) is collected only to the extent necessary and is not retained;
- Information gathered is intended to be used only internally for general service improvement and program management purposes and is not intended for release outside of NSF (if released, NSF must indicate the qualitative nature of the information);
- Information gathered will not be used for the purpose of substantially informing influential policy decisions; and
- Information gathered will yield qualitative information; the collection will not be designed or expected to yield statistically reliable results or used as though the results are generalizable to the population of study.

Feedback collected under this generic clearance provides useful information, but it does not yield data that can be generalized to the overall population. This type of generic clearance for qualitative information will not be used for quantitative information collections that are designed to yield reliably actionable results, such as monitoring trends over time or documenting program performance. Such data uses require more rigorous designs that address: The target population to which generalizations will be made, the sampling frame, the sample design (including stratification and clustering), the precision requirements or power calculations that justify the proposed sample size, the expected response rate, methods for assessing potential nonresponse bias, the protocols for data collection, and any testing procedures that were or will be undertaken prior to fielding this study. Depending on the degree of influence the results are likely to have, such collections may still be eligible for submission for other generic mechanisms that are designed to yield quantitative results.

As a general matter, this information collection will not result in any new system of records containing privacy information and will not ask questions of a sensitive nature, such as sexual behavior and attitudes, religious beliefs, and other matters that are commonly considered private.

Below we provide the National Science Foundation's projected average estimates for the next three years:

Affected Public: Individuals and Households, Businesses and Organizations, State, Local or Tribal Government.

Average Expected Annual Number of activities: 50.

Respondents: 500 per activity.

Annual responses: 30,000.

Frequency of Response: Once per request.

Average minutes per response: 30.

Burden hours: 25,000.

Comments: Comments are invited on (a) whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Agency, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information on respondents, including through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Dated: March 1, 2023.

Suzanne H. Plimpton,

Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation.

[FR Doc. 2023–04540 Filed 3–3–23; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC–2023–0036]

NRC Bulletin 2012–01: Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Bulletin; closure.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this notice to inform all holders of operating licenses and combined licenses for nuclear power reactors of the closure of ''NRC Bulletin 2012–01: Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System'' (Bulletin). NRC has completed evaluations and inspections of the responses and other actions taken by the licensees of the nuclear power plants in response to NRC Bulletin 2012–01. The staff has approved the actions to be taken by the licensee for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 following commencement of operations and will inspect these actions under the Reactor Oversight Process. The NRC staff concludes that any potential adverse impact on nuclear plant safety due to an open phase condition (OPC) in the plant offsite power system has been adequately addressed by the licensees.

DATES: NRC Bulletin 2012–01 is closed effective March 6, 2023.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to NRC–2023–0036 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly available information related to this document using any of the following methods:

- *Federal Rulemaking Website:* Go to *https://www.regulations.gov* and search for NRC–2023–0036. Address questions about Docket IDs in *Regulations.gov* to Stacy Schumann; telephone: 301–415–0624; email: *Stacy.Schumann@nrc.gov.* For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** section of this document.
- *NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS):* You may obtain publicly available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at *https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.* To begin the search, select ''Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to *PDR.Resource@nrc.gov.* For the convenience of the reader, instructions about obtaining materials referenced in

this document are provided in the ''Availability of Documents'' section.

• *NRC's PDR:* You may examine and purchase copies of public documents, by appointment, at the NRC's PDR, Room P1 B35, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. To make an appointment to visit the PDR, please send an email to *PDR.Resource@nrc.gov* or call 1–800–397–4209 or 301–415–4737, between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. eastern time (ET), Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wendell Morton, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone: 301–415–1658, email: *Wendell.Morton@nrc.gov.*

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

The NRC is providing this technical summary in this **Federal Register** notice (FRN) to explain the basis for closure of ''NRC Bulletin 2012–01: Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System.'' This FRN informs external stakeholders that the adverse impacts on nuclear plant safe operation due to an OPC in the plant offsite power system have been adequately addressed, and the Bulletin is closed.

II. Background

An OPC event occurred in the offsite power circuit at Bryon Unit 2 on January 30, 2012. The station auxiliary transformer (SAT) (offsite power source) high-voltage side event caused unbalanced voltage conditions on the low-voltage side of the SAT, which led to a reactor trip and tripping of certain safety related loads. The existing undervoltage degraded voltage protection scheme failed to detect the unbalanced voltage and did not automatically separate the degraded offsite power source from the onsite power source. Operator action was required to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition. The event is further described in the ''Availability of Documents'' section.

In addition to the event previously described, two additional events were discussed in NRC Information Notice 2012–03. In these events, the OPC occurred on the offsite circuits that usually remain energized without a load or with a light load during normal conditions. At the related plants, the safety and non-safety-related loads are normally fed from the main generator through unit auxiliary transformers, therefore the offsite circuits that feed the safety-related loads during plant startup or after unit trip usually remain on no-load or are lightly loaded during normal plant conditions. The OPCs at these plants were not detected for many days. If a design basis event had occurred simultaneously, the unbalanced voltages at the safety-related buses would have increased due to shifting of loads from unit auxiliary transformers to offsite circuits due an OPC and could impact the safety of plants. The degree of unbalanced voltage conditions on the plant buses due to an OPC in the offsite power circuit is dependent on the offsite circuit design parameters, plant configuration, and plant loading conditions. The unbalanced voltage condition can potentially lead to either degraded operation of the safety-related loads if the voltage unbalance is small (about five percent or less) or tripping of the safety-related loads if the voltage unbalance is large, either of which is an unsafe condition. Therefore, the timely mitigation of an OPC is necessary to ensure the safety of the plant.

In light of the Byron and other events, on July 27, 2012, the NRC issued Bulletin 2012–01: Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System. The Bulletin required that all holders of operating licenses and combined licenses for nuclear power reactors verify compliance with the regulatory requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, ''Electric Power Systems,'' in Appendix A, ''General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,'' to Part 50 of title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) or the applicable principal design criteria in the licensees' updated final safety analysis report; and the design criteria for protection systems under 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) or 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3). The licensees were requested to describe plant design features that would allow the existing protective schemes to detect and respond to an OPC.

Licensees provided responses to the Bulletin and the NRC staff issued a summary report of the responses on February 26, 2013. In the summary report, the staff determined that for the operating plants, one or both trains of safety related electrical buses could be affected by an OPC. The NRC staff became aware of the OPC during an event at Byron Unit 2 that rendered both the offsite power system and the onsite power system unable to perform their intended safety functions. The NRC determined further regulatory action was required to ensure detection and automatic system response to an OPC at nuclear power plants. Further, the NRC determined that licensees should ensure that offsite and onsite electric power systems would remain available to permit the functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety in the event of anticipated operational occurrences and accidents.

III. Discussion

Two public meetings were held with industry on February 13, 2013, and June 13, 2013, in which various industry representatives presented possible solutions for the detection and protection from the new challenge faced due to OPCs. The minutes from these meetings as well as presentations by industry representatives are available in the ''Availability of Documents'' section.

In its letter dated October 9, 2013, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) provided a voluntary industry initiative plan, which included a formal commitment by the licensees to address plant vulnerabilities due to potential OPCs. The initiative goal and definition included: an OPC will not prevent functioning of important-to-safety structures, systems, and components. An OPC is defined as an open phase, with or without a ground, which is located on the high voltage side of a transformer connecting a GDC 17 off-site power circuit to the transmission system. The initiative was slated for completion by December 31, 2017.

Bulletin 2012–01 stated that GDC 17 in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, and 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) for operating plants or 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3) for any plants after May 13, 1999, are applicable.

In its letter dated March 21, 2014, NEI provided its perspective that the protection system requirements described in 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2), ''Protection systems,'' do not apply to the Open Phase Isolation Systems (OPISs).

In the letter dated August 14, 2014, NEI provided the industry position with respect to various regulatory issues related to OPC.

The NRC provided a November 25, 2014, response to NEI to address the issues raised in the March 2014 and August 2014 letters, and explained that to address OPCs, four functional requirements should be met. The letter also stated that until each licensee has addressed OPCs and informed the NRC that it is in full compliance with GDC 17, or the principal design criteria specified in the updated final safety analysis report for the specific plant regarding OPC, the staff would be recommending an interim enforcement policy (IEP) to the Commission.

NEI provided Revision 1 of the voluntary industry initiative dated March 16, 2015, with a schedule change for OPC modifications completion from

December 31, 2017, to December 31, 2018.

In SECY–16–0068, dated May 31, 2016, the NRC staff proposed a revision to the Enforcement Policy to permit the staff to exercise enforcement discretion for certain noncompliance's with technical specifications or GDC 17, and certain nonconformances with the analogous principal design criteria specified in the updated final safety analysis report, as well as noncompliance's with 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) or 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(3), and 10 CFR 50.36. The potential violations could be those associated with inoperable electrical power systems (offsite and onsite) caused by an OPC design vulnerability in the offsite electric power system that would require a reactor shutdown or prevent a reactor startup if a licensee could not come into conformance within the technical specification required completion times.

In SRM–SECY–16–0068 dated March 9, 2017, the Commission disapproved the staff's request to establish an IEP. Instead, the Commission directed the staff to (1) verify that licensees have appropriately implemented the voluntary industry initiative; (2) update the Reactor Oversight Process to provide periodic oversight of industry's implementation of the OPC initiative; and (3) close the Bulletin once satisfactory implementation of the technical resolution has been verified for each licensee.

On October 31, 2017, the NRC staff issued Temporary Instruction 2515/194, to verify that licensees appropriately implemented the NEI voluntary industry initiative. The NRC inspectors verified implementation at plants where OPC modifications were substantially complete.

NEI provided Revision 2 of the voluntary industry initiative, dated September 20, 2018, with the completion schedule changed from December 31, 2018, to December 31, 2019. NEI stated that many plants had completed installation of OPIS with other plants scheduled to complete during 2018. However, the monitoring data to date had indicated that installed OPISs would have experienced undesirable spurious actuations if the automatic trip functions had been activated. NEI proposed extended monitoring periods so that licensees could refine OPIS setpoints to minimize spurious actuations.

Due to continuing spurious actuations of OPIS designs observed at some plants, NEI provided Revision 3 dated June 6, 2019, of the initiative. This revision included an option to perform a risk evaluation under certain boundary conditions to support an alarm and manual response to an OPC, instead of an automatic trip response. For plants adopting the risk-informed option, the OPIS design would change from ''alarm and automatically trip (isolate)'' to ''alarm (detect) and manual actions'' to isolate the OPC. Written plant alarm response procedures would allow operators to diagnose and take manual actions to mitigate an OPC. NEI also separately provided NEI 19–02, ''Guidance for Assessing Open Phase Condition Implementation Using Risk Insights,'' referenced in Revision 3 of the initiative.

To evaluate whether safety significance justified requiring automatic OPIS actuation, the NRC staff performed a backfit screening and documented the results in a memo dated May 21, 2020. The analysis determined that automatic OPIS actuation would not result in a substantial increase in the overall protection of the public health and safety. Therefore, the risk-informed option in Revision 3 to the voluntary industry initiative was acceptable.

On August 18, 2020, the NRC staff issued Revision 2 of the Temporary Instruction 2515/194, to verify that licensees have appropriately implemented the NEI voluntary industry initiative, including licensees that adopted the risk-informed option. For licensees where OPIS implementation was still in the monitoring mode and spurious initiations continued to occur, many changed to the risk-informed option of the voluntary industry initiative. Approximately 65 percent of operating power reactors have adopted the risk-informed option. This change, and the COVID–19 pandemic, resulted in delays in licensees' implementation of the voluntary industry initiative and the subsequent inspections at many plants.

As required by SRM–SECY–16–0068, the Reactor Oversight Process Inspection Procedures and the Inspection Manual Chapter were revised to provide periodic oversight of industry's implementation of the OPC voluntary industry initiative.

IV. Conclusion

The staff issued closure letters to each licensee other than Southern Nuclear Company for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. ADAMS accession numbers to these letters are in the ''Availability of Documents'' section. The closure letters provide further details concerning how licensees addressed OPC at their facilities.

The staff has approved the actions to be taken by the licensee for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 following commencement of operations, by letter dated July 5, 2019, agreeing to the due dates and will inspect these actions under the Reactor Oversight Process. By letter dated August 29, 2018, Southern Nuclear Company to NRC (Vogtle Units 3 and 4), provided regulatory commitments and due dates regarding the OPC.

The licensees of the following plants received Bulletin 2012–01, but subsequently permanently ceased operation prior to addressing the Bulletin: Crystal River 3; Duane Arnold; Fort Calhoun; Indian Point 2; Kewaunee; Oyster Creek; Palisades; Pilgrim 1; San Onofre 2; San Onofre 3; Three Mile Island 1; Vermont Yankee.

Based on the actions taken by the NRC and licensees in response to the Bulletin, the NRC staff finds that all operating plants will continue to operate safely or safely shut down in response to an OPC event. Therefore, Bulletin 2012–01 is closed.

V. Availability of Documents

The documents identified in the following table are available to interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as indicated.

Document description	ADAMS accession No.
Information Notice 2012–03: Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System, dated March 1, 2012	ML120480170.
Presentation by Exelon Nuclear—Byron Station Single Phase Failure, dated March 22, 2012	ML120810365.
Licensee Event Report 2012–001–01 ''Unit 2 Loss of Normal Offsite Power and Reactor Trip and Unit 1 Loss of Normal Offsite Power Due to Failure of System Auxiliary Transformer Inverted Insulators,'' dated September 28, 2012.	ML12272A358.
Byron Unit 2—NRC Special Inspection Team (SIT) Report, dated March 27, 2012	ML12087A213.
Bulletin 2012–01: Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System, dated July 27, 2012	ML12074A115.
Summary report of licensee responses, dated February 26, 2013	ML13052A711.
Public meeting summary	ML13066A774 (package).
Public meeting summary	ML13196A002 (package).

Document description	ADAMS accession No.
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) voluntary industry initiative plan, dated October 9, 2013	ML13333A147.
NEI perspective letter on Open Phase Isolation Systems (OPISs), dated March 21, 2014	ML14087A252 (package).
NEI letter that provided the industry position with respect to various regulatory issues related to OPC, dated August 14, 2014.	ML14226A804 (package).
NRC's response to NEI to address the issues raised in the March 2014 and August 2014 letters, and explained that to address OPCs, four functional requirements should be met, dated November 25, 2014.	ML14120A203.
NEI Revision 1 of the voluntary industry initiative plan, dated March 16, 2015	ML15075A454 (package).
SECY–16–0068, dated May 31, 2016	ML15219A327, Enclosure ML15219A330.
SRM–SECY–16–0068, dated March 9, 2017	ML17068A297.
NRC staff issued Temporary Instruction 2515/194, dated October 31, 2017	ML17137A416.
NEI Revision 2 of the voluntary industry initiative, dated September 20, 2018	ML18268A114.
NEI Revision 3 of the voluntary industry initiative, dated June 6, 2019	ML19163A176.
NEI 19–02, "Guidance for Assessing Open Phase Condition Implementation Using Risk Insights," dated June 20, 2019.	ML19172A086.
NRC backfit screening memo, dated May 21, 2020	ML19198A304.
NRC Revision 2 of the Temporary Instruction 2515/194, dated August 18, 2020	ML20230A328.
NRC Response to Supplemental Information for Bulletin 2012–01, Vogtle 3 and 4 (052–25 and 52–026), dated July 5, 2019.	ML19182A206.
Vogtle, Units 3 and 4, Supplement to Response to NRC Bulletin 2012–01, Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System, dated August 29, 2018.	ML18242A012.
Arkansas Nuclear 1 Closure Letter, dated March 5, 2021	ML21049A307.
Arkansas Nuclear 2 Closure Letter, dated March 5, 2021	ML21049A307.
Beaver Valley 1 Closure Letter, dated July 15, 2022	ML22189A184.
Beaver Valley 2 Closure Letter, dated July 15, 2022	ML22189A184.
Braidwood 1 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
Braidwood 2 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
Browns Ferry 1 Closure Letter, dated May 1, 2020	ML20104A192.
Browns Ferry 2 Closure Letter, dated May 1, 2020	ML20104A192.
Browns Ferry 3 Closure Letter, dated May 1, 2020	ML20104A192.
Brunswick 1 Closure Letter, dated October 12, 2021	ML21278A002.
Brunswick 2 Closure Letter, dated October 12, 2021	ML21278A002.
Byron 1 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
Byron 2 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
Callaway Closure Letter, dated July 27, 2021	ML21201A105.
Calvert Cliffs 1 Closure Letter, dated September 7, 2021	ML21225A432.
Calvert Cliffs 2 Closure Letter, dated September 7, 2021	ML21225A432.
Catawba 1 Closure Letter, dated October 19, 2021	ML21272A183.
Catawba 2 Closure Letter, dated October 19, 2021	ML21272A183.
Clinton Closure Letter, dated July 8, 2022	ML22186A150.
Columbia Closure Letter, dated June 29, 2021	ML21165A344.
Comanche Peak 1 Closure Letter, dated July 26, 2023	ML23025A353.
Comanche Peak 2 Closure Letter, dated July 26, 2023	ML23025A353.
Cooper Closure Letter, dated November 22, 2021	ML21323A074.
D.C. Cook 1 Closure Letter, dated May 26, 2021	ML22146A113.
D.C. Cook 2 Closure Letter, dated May 26, 2021	ML22146A113.
Davis-Besse Closure Letter, dated July 21, 2022	ML22195A223.
Diablo Canyon 1 Closure Letter, dated April 29, 2022	ML22108A286.
Diablo Canyon 2 Closure Letter, dated April 29, 2022	ML22108A286.
Dresden 2 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
Dresden 3 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
Farley 1 Closure Letter, dated August 23, 2021	ML21216A316.
Farley 2 Closure Letter, dated August 23, 2021	ML21216A316.
Fermi 2 Closure Letter, dated July 21, 2022	ML22188A089.
FitzPatrick Closure Letter, November 16, 2021	ML21300A006.
Ginna Closure Letter, dated September 20, 2021	ML21245A098.
Grand Gulf Closure Letter, dated March 5, 2021	ML21049A307.
Harris 1 Closure Letter, dated September 29, 2021	ML21252A389.
Hatch 1 Closure Letter, dated September 20, 2021	ML21253A113.
Hatch 2 Closure Letter, dated September 20, 2021	ML21253A113.
Hope Creek 1 Closure Letter, dated March 11, 2022	ML22060A057.
Indian Point 3 Closure Letter, dated March 5, 2021	ML21049A307.
La Salle 1 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
La Salle 2 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
Limerick 1 Closure Letter, dated September 13, 2021	ML21245A084.
Limerick 2 Closure Letter, dated September 13, 2021	ML21245A084.
McGuire 1 Closure Letter, dated October 27, 2021	ML21293A026.
McGuire 2 Closure Letter, dated October 27, 2021	ML21293A026.
Millstone 2 Closure Letter, dated November 15, 2021	ML21295A412.
Millstone 3 Closure Letter, dated November 15, 2021	ML21295A412.
Monticello Closure Letter, dated July 29, 2022	ML22189A019.
Nine Mile Point 1 Closure Letter, dated September 7, 2021	ML21239A052.
Nine Mile Point 2 Closure Letter, dated September 7, 2021	ML21239A052.
North Anna 1 Closure Letter, dated May 5, 2020	ML20065L173.

Document description	ADAMS accession No.
North Anna 2 Closure Letter, dated May 5, 2020	ML20065L173.
Oconee 1 Closure Letter, dated February 17, 2022	ML22045A024.
Oconee 2 Closure Letter, dated February 17, 2022	ML22045A024.
Oconee 3 Closure Letter, dated February 17, 2022	ML22045A024.
Palo Verde 1 Closure Letter, April 20, 2022	ML22102A262.
Palo Verde 2 Closure Letter, April 20, 2022	ML22102A262.
Palo Verde 3 Closure Letter, April 20, 2022	ML22102A262.
Peach Bottom 2 Closure Letter, dated September 7, 2021	ML21196A010.
Peach Bottom 3 Closure Letter dated September 7, 2021	ML21196A010.
Perry 1 Closure Letter, dated July 13, 2022	ML22189A177.
Point Beach 1 Closure Letter, dated July 13, 2021	ML21187A153.
Point Beach 2 Closure Letter, dated July 13, 2021	ML21187A153.
Prairie Island 1 Closure Letter, dated May 26, 2022	ML22145A020.
Prairie Island 2 Closure Letter, dated May 26, 2022	ML22145A020.
Quad Cities 1 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
Quad Cities 2 Closure Letter, dated April 27, 2021	ML21102A182.
River Bend 1 Closure Letter, dated March 5, 2021	ML21049A307.
Robinson 2 Closure Letter, dated March 29, 2022	ML22083A003.
Saint Lucie 1 Closure Letter, dated October 28, 2021	ML21281A012.
Saint Lucie 2 Closure Letter, dated October 28, 2021	ML21281A012.
Salem 1 Closure Letter, dated November 19, 2021	ML21320A204.
Salem 2 Closure Letter, dated November 19, 2021	ML21320A204.
Seabrook 1 Closure Letter, dated March 24, 2020	ML20071C899.
Sequoyah 1 Closure Letter, dated May 1, 2020	ML20104A192.
Sequoyah 2 Closure Letter, dated May 1, 2020	ML20104A192.
South Texas 1 Closure Letter, dated August 5, 2020	ML20206L260.
South Texas 2 Closure Letter, dated August 5, 2020	ML20206L260.
Surry 1 Closure Letter, dated May 5, 2020	ML20065L173.
Surry 2 Closure Letter, dated May 5, 2020	ML20065L173.
Susquehanna 1 Closure Letter, dated December 6, 2021	ML21335A422.
Susquehanna 2 Closure Letter, dated December 6, 2021	ML21335A422.
Turkey Point 3 Closure Letter, dated July 19, 2022	ML22187A277.
Turkey Point 4 Closure Letter, dated July 19, 2022	ML22187A277.
VC Summer Closure Letter, dated September 14, 2021	ML21242A330.
Vogtle 1 Closure Letter, dated October 22, 2021	ML21279A167.
Vogtle 2 Closure Letter, dated October 22, 2021	ML21279A167.
Waterford 3 Closure Letter, dated June 22, 2020	ML20171A366.
Watts Bar 1 Closure Letter, dated May 1, 2020	ML20104A192.
Watts Bar 2 Closure Letter, dated May 1, 2020	ML20104A192.
Wolf Creek 1 Closure Letter, dated February 10, 2022	ML22040A158.

Dated: March 1, 2023.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Lisa M. Regner,

Chief, Generic Communication and Operating Experience Branch, Division of Reactor Oversight, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 2023–04501 Filed 3–3–23; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC–2023–0001]

Sunshine Act Meetings

TIME AND DATE: Weeks of March 6, 13, 20, 27, April 3, 10, 2023. The schedule for Commission meetings is subject to change on short notice. The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the internet at: *https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/public-meetings/schedule.html.*

PLACE: The NRC provides reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities where appropriate. If you need a reasonable accommodation to participate in these public meetings or need this meeting notice or the transcript or other information from the public meetings in another format (*e.g.,* braille, large print), please notify Anne Silk, NRC Disability Program Specialist, at 301–287–0745, by videophone at 240–428–3217, or by email at *Anne.Silk@nrc.gov.* Determinations on requests for reasonable accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis.

STATUS: Public and closed.

Members of the public may request to receive the information in these notices electronically. If you would like to be added to the distribution, please contact the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of the Secretary, Washington, DC 20555, at 301–415–1969, or by email at *Wendy.Moore@nrc.gov* or *Tyesha.Bush@nrc.gov.*

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

Week of March 6, 2023

Tuesday, March 7, 2023

10:00 a.m. Briefing on NRC International Activities (Closed Ex. 1 and 9)

Week of March 13, 2023—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for the week of March 13, 2023.

Week of March 20, 2023—Tentative

There are no meetings scheduled for the week of March 20, 2023.

Week of March 27, 2023—Tentative

Thursday, March 30, 2023

9:00 a.m. Briefing on Nuclear Regulatory Research Program (Public Meeting), (Contact: Nicholas Difrancesco: 301–415–1115)

Additional Information: The meeting will be held in the Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The public is invited to attend the Commission's meeting in person or watch live via