

Secretary of the Navy, hereby finds and certifies that USS FRANK E. PETERSON JR. (DDG 121) is a vessel of special construction or purpose, and that, with respect to the position of the following navigational lights, it is not possible to comply fully with the requirements of the provisions enumerated in the 72 COLREGS without interfering with the special function of the vessel:

Annex I, paragraph 3(a), pertaining to the position of the forward masthead light; Annex I, paragraph 2(f)(i) pertaining to the vertical position of the aft masthead light; Annex I, paragraph 3(a), pertaining to the horizontal distance between the masthead lights; Annex I, paragraph 3(c), pertaining to the horizontal distance of the "task lights" below the masthead lights; Annex I, paragraph 2(f)(ii), pertaining to the horizontal position of the task lights above the aft masthead light(s) and vertical position of the task lights between the forward masthead light(s) and aft masthead light(s).

The DAJAG (Admiralty and Maritime Law) further finds and certifies that these navigational lights are in closest possible compliance with the applicable provision of the 72 COLREGS.

Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1605(c), E.O. 11964.

Approved: April 19, 2021.

K.R. Callan,

Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U. S. Navy, Federal Register Liaison Officer.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Navy

Certificate of Alternate Compliance for USS LYNDON B. JOHNSON (DDG-1002)

AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD.

ACTION: Notice of Issuance of Certificate of Alternate Compliance.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Navy hereby announces that a Certificate of Alternate Compliance has been issued for USS LYNDON B. JOHNSON (DDG-1002). Due to the special construction and purpose of this vessel, the Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General (DAJAG)(Admiralty and Maritime Law) has determined it is a vessel of the Navy which, due to its special construction and purpose, cannot comply fully with the navigation lights provisions of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS) without interfering with its special function as a naval ship. The intended

effect of this notice is to warn mariners in waters where 72 COLREGS apply.

DATES: This Certificate of Alternate Compliance is effective April 22, 2021 and is applicable beginning April 16, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Lieutenant Commander Darren E. Myers, JAGC, U.S. Navy, Admiralty Attorney, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Admiralty and Maritime Law Division (Code 11), 1322 Patterson Ave. SE, Suite 3000, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066, 202-685-5040, or admiralty@navy.mil.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background and Purpose

Executive Order 11964 of January 19, 1977 and 33 U.S.C. 1605 provide that the requirements of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (72 COLREGS), as to the number, position, range, or arc of visibility of lights or shapes, as well as to the disposition and characteristics of sound-signaling appliances, shall not apply to a vessel or class of vessels of the Navy where the Secretary of the Navy shall find and certify that, by reason of special construction or purpose, it is not possible for such vessel(s) to comply fully with the provisions without interfering with the special function of the vessel(s). Notice of issuance of a Certificate of Alternate Compliance must be made in the **Federal Register**.

In accordance with 33 U.S.C. 1605, the DAJAG (Admiralty and Maritime Law), under authority delegated by the Secretary of the Navy, hereby finds and certifies that USS LYNDON B. JOHNSON (DDG-1002) is a vessel of special construction or purpose, and that, with respect to the position of the following navigational lights, it is not possible to comply fully with the requirements of the provisions enumerated in the 72 COLREGS without interfering with the special function of the vessel:

Annex I, paragraph 3(a), pertaining to the horizontal separation distance between the masthead lights; Annex I, paragraph 2(a)(i), pertaining to the height of the masthead light above the main deck; Annex I, paragraph 2(k) pertaining to the vertical separation and height above deck of the anchor lights; Annex I, paragraph 2(g), pertaining to the vertical position of the sidelights; Annex I, paragraph 3(c), pertaining to the horizontal spacing of the task lights; Annex I, paragraph 2(i)(iii), pertaining to the vertical positioning and spacing of the task lights.

The DAJAG (Admiralty and Maritime Law) further finds and certifies that these navigational lights are in closest possible compliance with the applicable provision of the 72 COLREGS.

Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1605(c), E.O. 11964.

Approved: April 19, 2021.

K.R. Callan,

Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U. S. Navy, Federal Register Liaison Officer.

[FR Doc. 2021-08357 Filed 4-21-21; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities

AGENCY: Office of Electricity, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Revocation of prohibition order.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE or Department) gives notice that the Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities, dated December 17, 2020 (December 2020 Prohibition Order), is revoked.

DATES: The effective date of the revocation of the December 2020 Prohibition Order is April 20, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Patricia A. Hoffman, Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity, U.S. Department of Energy, Mailstop OE-20, Room 8G-042, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585; (202) 586-1411, or electricsystemEO@hq.doe.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Nation's energy infrastructure supports our national defense, critical infrastructure, economy, and way of life. Adversarial nation-state actors are targeting our critical infrastructure, with increasing focus on the energy sector. The Department is engaged in partnership with the electricity subsector and other Federal agencies, in a comprehensive set of actions to strengthen supply chain risk management and recognizes the threat our foreign adversaries pose to our critical infrastructure.

In order to build on the work the Department has already completed in securing the electric system, the Department is developing recommendations to strengthen requirements and capabilities for supply chain risk management practices by the Nation's electric utilities. These recommendations are intended to enable an approach that builds on, clarifies, and, where appropriate, modifies prior executive and agency actions.

Executive Order 13920, *Securing the United States Bulk-Power System*, (E.O. 13920),¹ issued on May 1, 2020, declared an emergency that authorized the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) to, among other actions, prohibit the acquisition, transfer, or installation of certain BPS electric equipment sourced from foreign adversary countries for one year.² On December 17, 2020, the Secretary issued the December 2020 Prohibition Order, which took effect January 16, 2021, invoking the authority of E.O. 13920.³ Pursuant to the December 2020 Prohibition Order, a limited number of utilities⁴ were prohibited from acquiring, importing, transferring, or installing certain BPS electric equipment.⁵ That order targeted select equipment manufactured or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of the People's Republic of China.⁶

On January 20, 2021, Executive Order 13990, *Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis* (E.O. 13990), was issued, which suspended E.O. 13920 for 90 days and directed the Secretary of Energy and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget jointly to “consider whether to recommend that a replacement order be issued.”⁷ As the December 2020 Prohibition Order is predicated on the authorities delegated to DOE by E.O. 13920, the December 2020 Prohibition Order was also suspended during the same time period.

The Department is revoking the December 2020 Prohibition Order effective April 20, 2021, in order to create a stable policy environment before the emergency declaration made by E.O. 13920 expires on May 1, 2021, and while the Department conducts a Request for Information to develop a strengthened and administrable strategy to address the security of the U.S. energy sector.

Signing Authority

This document of the Department of Energy was signed on April 19, 2021, by Jennifer Granholm, Secretary of Energy. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE **Federal Register Liaison Officer** has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the **Federal Register**.

Signed in Washington, DC, on April 20, 2021.

Treena V. Garrett,

Federal Register Liaison Officer, U.S. Department of Energy.

[FR Doc. 2021–08483 Filed 4–21–21; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Ensuring the Continued Security of the United States Critical Electric Infrastructure

AGENCY: Office of Electricity, Department of Energy (DOE).

ACTION: Request for information.

SUMMARY: The United States Government recognizes the immediate imperative to secure our electric infrastructure. The electric power system is vital to the Nation's energy security, supporting national defense, emergency services, critical infrastructure, and the economy. Preventing exploitation and attacks by foreign threats to the U.S. supply chain is the focus of this Request for Information (RFI). On January 20, 2021, Executive Order, *Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis*, suspended Executive Order, *Securing the United States Bulk-Power System*, for 90 days and directed the Secretary of Energy and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to consider whether to recommend that a replacement order be issued. In the process of developing such recommendations, the Department of Energy (DOE or the Department) identified opportunities to institutionalize change, increase awareness, and strengthen protections against high-risk electric equipment transactions by foreign adversaries, while providing additional certainty to

the utility industry and the public. As the United States Government considers whether to recommend a replacement Executive Order that appropriately balances national security, economic, and administrability considerations, the Department is seeking information from electric utilities, academia, research laboratories, government agencies, and other stakeholders on various aspects of the electric infrastructure.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before June 7, 2021. If you anticipate difficulty in submitting comments within that period, contact the person listed in **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT** as soon as possible.

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are encouraged to submit written comments to ElectricSystemEO@hq.doe.gov. All comments will be posted and available to the public www.energy.gov/oe/securing-critical-electric-infrastructure. Written comments may also be delivered by conventional mail to Michael Coe, Director, Energy Resilience Division of the Office of Electricity, U.S. Department of Energy, Mailstop OE–20, Room 8H–033, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585. In light of the national emergency concerning the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) pandemic and personnel limitations, commenters are encouraged to submit comments electronically. Commenters are further cautioned that all conventional mail to the Department is subject to an automatic security screening process that may take several weeks and sometimes renders mailed material illegible.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Coe, Director, Energy Resilience Division of the Office of Electricity, U.S. Department of Energy, Mailstop OE–20, Room 8G–042, 1000 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20585; (202) 287–5166; or ElectricSystemEO@hq.doe.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

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I. Introduction

A. Background

The Nation's energy infrastructure is fundamental to national security, the continuity of our economy, and our way of life. Adversarial nation-state actors are targeting our critical infrastructure, with increasing focus on the energy

¹ Executive Order 13920, *Securing the United States Bulk-Power System*: Request for Information, 85 FR 26595 (May 4, 2020).

² Id. at 26595–26596.

³ Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities, 86 FR 533 (Jan. 6, 2021).

⁴ The December 2020 Prohibition Order defined “Responsible Utility” as “an electric utility that owns or operates Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI), as defined by section 215A(a)(4) of the Federal Power Act (FPA), that actively serves a CDF, as designated by the Secretary under section 215A(c) of the FPA.” Id. at 534.

⁵ Id.

⁶ Id.

⁷ Executive Order 13990, *Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis*, § 7(c), 86 FR 7037, 7042 (Jan. 25, 2021).