

the access and amendment provisions. If an agency claims an exemption, however, it must issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to make clear to the public the reasons why a particular exemption is claimed.

DHS is claiming exemptions from certain requirements of the Privacy Act for DHS/OPS—003 Operations Collection, Planning, Coordination, Reporting, Analysis, and Fusion System of Records. Some information in DHS/OPS—003 Operations Collection, Planning, Coordination, Reporting, Analysis, and Fusion System of Records relates to official DHS national security, law enforcement, immigration, and intelligence activities. These exemptions are needed to protect information relating to DHS activities from disclosure to subjects or others related to these activities. Specifically, the exemptions are required to preclude subjects of these activities from frustrating these processes; to avoid disclosure of activity techniques; to protect the identities and physical safety of confidential informants and law enforcement personnel; to ensure DHS' ability to obtain information from third parties and other sources; to protect the privacy of third parties; and to safeguard classified information. Disclosure of information to the subject of the inquiry could also permit the subject to avoid detection or apprehension.

The exemptions proposed here are standard law enforcement and national security exemptions exercised by a large number of federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In appropriate circumstances, where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement purposes of this system and the overall law enforcement process, the applicable exemptions may be waived on a case by case basis.

#### List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5

Freedom of information; Privacy.

For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

#### PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION

1. The authority citation for part 5 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 6 U.S.C. 101 *et seq.*; Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135; 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552. Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.

2. Add at the end of Appendix C to Part 5, the following new paragraph “53”:

#### Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy Act

\* \* \* \* \*

53. The DHS/OPS—003 Operations Collection, Planning, Coordination, Reporting, Analysis, and Fusion System of Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by DHS/OPS. The DHS/OPS—003 Operations Collection, Planning, Coordination, Reporting, Analysis, and Fusion System of Records is a repository of information held by DHS in connection with its several and varied missions and functions, including, but not limited to: the enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations, inquiries, and proceedings there under; national security and intelligence activities. The DHS/OPS—003 Operations Collection, Planning, Coordination, Reporting, Analysis, and Fusion System of Records contains information that is collected by, on behalf of, in support of, or in cooperation with DHS and its components and may contain personally identifiable information collected by other federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or international government agencies.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is exempting this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act, subject to limitations set forth in 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (k)(1), (k)(2), and (k)(3). Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the following reasons:

(a) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would undermine the entire investigative process.

(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to the records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition, permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose security-sensitive

information that could be detrimental to homeland security.

(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information) because in the course of investigations into potential violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity.

(d) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this system are exempt from the individual access provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with respect to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of records or otherwise setting up procedures pursuant to which individuals may access and view records pertaining to themselves in the system would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the identities of witnesses, and potential witnesses, and confidential informants.

Dated: November 5, 2010.

**Mary Ellen Callahan,**  
*Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.*

[FR Doc. 2010–28572 Filed 11–12–10; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 9110–9A–P**

#### DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

##### Federal Aviation Administration

##### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2010–1112; Directorate Identifier 2010–NM–051–AD]

RIN 2120–AA64

##### Airworthiness Directives; Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

The flight crew of a F28 Mark 0070 (Fokker 70) aeroplane received a MLG [main landing gear] unsafe message after landing gear down selection during approach. \* \* \*

Inspection just after landing revealed a lot of ice near the LH (left-hand) MLG downlock actuator. \* \* \*

Based on the quantity and location of the ice, it is considered highly likely that the ice had formed between the upper end of the downlock actuator and the upper side brace, and was accumulated during taxi on slush- and snow-contaminated taxiways and runway at the departure airport.

Ice in this location prevents the actuator from turning freely relative to the upper side brace during landing gear down selection, likely resulting in failure of the piston rod. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further cases of MLG extension problems, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane during landing roll-out.

\* \* \* \* \*

The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by December 30, 2010.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

- *Fax:* (202) 493-2251.

- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.

- *Hand Delivery:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For Fokker service information identified in this proposed AD, contact Fokker Services B.V., Technical Services Dept., P.O. Box 231, 2150 AE Nieuw-Vennep, the Netherlands; telephone +31 (0)252-627-350; fax +31 (0)252-627-211; e-mail [technicalservices.fokkerservices@stork.com](mailto:technicalservices.fokkerservices@stork.com); Internet <http://www.myfokkerfleet.com>.

For Goodrich service information identified in this proposed AD, contact Goodrich Corporation, Landing Gear, 1400 South Service Road, West Oakville L6L 5Y7, Ontario, Canada; telephone 905-827-7777; e-mail [jean.breed@goodrich.com](mailto:jean.breed@goodrich.com); Internet <http://www.goodrich.com/TechPubs>. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

## Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

### Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2010-1112; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-051-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

### Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 2009-0268, dated December 17, 2009 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

The flight crew of a F28 Mark 0070 (Fokker 70) aeroplane received a MLG [main landing gear] unsafe message after landing gear down selection during approach. After cycling the landing gear, only a LH [left-hand] MLG unsafe indication remained. A go-around was initiated and alternate landing gear down selection was performed twice, but the LH MLG did not lock down. During final approach, without further flight gear action, all 3 green lights illuminated and an uneventful landing was made.

Inspection just after landing revealed a lot of ice near the LH MLG downlock actuator. Further investigation revealed that the piston rod of the downlock actuator had failed at the threaded end close to the eye end, which is attached to the lower lock link, and that the piston rod was broken in an overload by bending in the neck close to the threaded end.

Based on the quantity and location of the ice, it is considered highly likely that the ice had formed between the upper end of the downlock actuator and the upper side brace, and was accumulated during taxi on slush- and snow-contaminated taxiways and runway at the departure airport.

Ice in this location prevents the actuator from turning freely relative to the upper side brace during landing gear down selection, likely resulting in failure of the piston rod. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further cases of MLG extension problems, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane during landing roll-out.

To address this unsafe condition and prevent the accumulation of water, slush and/or snow, Goodrich, the MLG manufacturer, has introduced a new upper side brace, Part Number (P/N) 41350-3, which has two additional drain holes. Goodrich Service Bulletin (SB) 41350-32-25 describes the modification of the P/N 41350-1 MLG upper side brace, introducing the two additional drain holes and consequent re-identification of the part to P/N 41350-3.

For the reasons described above, this AD requires modification of both (LH and RH [right-hand]) P/N 41350-1 MLG upper side braces, or replacement of the P/N 41350-1 upper side braces with modified P/N 41350-3 upper side braces.

You may obtain further information by examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

### Relevant Service Information

Fokker Services B.V. has issued Service Bulletin SBF100-32-157, Revision 1, dated October 7, 2009. Goodrich Corporation has issued Service Bulletin 41350-32-25, dated January 30, 2009. The actions described in the service information are intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

### FAA's Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

### Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information provided in the MCAI and related service information.

We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are highlighted in a **NOTE** within the proposed AD.

### Costs of Compliance

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD would affect about 6 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it would take about 16 work-hours per product to comply with the basic requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is \$85 per work-hour. Required parts would cost about \$0 per product. Where the service information lists required parts costs that are covered under warranty, we have assumed that there will be no charge for these costs. As we do not control warranty coverage for affected parties, some parties may incur costs higher than estimated here. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed AD on U.S. operators to be \$8,160, or \$1,360 per product.

### Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. "Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs," describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in "Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements." Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

### Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed regulation:

1. Is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule" under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

### List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

### The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

### PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

#### § 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

**Fokker Services B.V.:** Docket No. FAA–2010–1112; Directorate Identifier 2010–NM–051–AD.

#### Comments Due Date

- (a) We must receive comments by December 30, 2010.

#### Affected ADs

- (b) None.

#### Applicability

- (c) This AD applies to Fokker Services B.V. Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes, certificated in any category; all serial numbers, if equipped with Goodrich (formerly Menasco, Colt Industries) main landing gears (MLGs) fitted with MLG upper side braces having part number (P/N) 41350–1.

### Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 32: Landing Gear.

### Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) states:

The flight crew of a F28 Mark 0070 (Fokker 70) aeroplane received a MLG [main landing gear] unsafe message after landing gear down selection during approach. \* \* \*

Inspection just after landing revealed a lot of ice near the LH MLG downlock actuator. \* \* \*

Based on the quantity and location of the ice, it is considered highly likely that the ice had formed between the upper end of the downlock actuator and the upper side brace, and was accumulated during taxi on slush- and snow-contaminated taxiways and runway at the departure airport.

Ice in this location prevents the actuator from turning freely relative to the upper side brace during landing gear down selection, likely resulting in failure of the piston rod. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further cases of MLG extension problems, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane during landing roll-out.

\* \* \* \* \*

### Compliance

(f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

### Actions

(g) Within 8,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, modify or replace the side stay upper braces of the left-hand and right-hand MLG, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Goodrich Service Bulletin 41350–32–25, dated January 30, 2009; and Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100–32–157, Revision 1, dated October 7, 2009.

(h) After modifying the side stay upper braces of the left-hand and right-hand MLG as required by paragraph (g) of this AD, do not install any Goodrich (formerly Menasco, Colt Industries) side stay upper brace assembly having P/N 41350–1 on any airplane.

(i) After modifying the side stay upper braces of the left-hand and right-hand MLG as required by paragraph (g) of this AD, do not install any Goodrich (formerly Menasco, Colt Industries) MLG on any airplane, unless the replacement MLG has side stay upper braces having P/N 41350–3.

### FAA AD Differences

**Note 1:** This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information as follows: No differences.

### Other FAA AD Provisions

(j) The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs):* The Manager, International Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

Send information to ATTN: Tom Rodriguez, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1137; fax (425) 227-1149. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

(2) **Airworthy Product:** For any requirement in this AD to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority (or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product is airworthy before it is returned to service.

(3) **Reporting Requirements:** For any reporting requirement in this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 *et seq.*), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.

#### Related Information

(k) Refer to MCAI European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness Directive 2009-0268, dated December 17, 2009; Fokker Service Bulletin SBF100-32-157, Revision 1, dated October 7, 2009; and Goodrich Service Bulletin 41350-32-25, dated January 30, 2009; for related information.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 3, 2010.

**Dionne Palermo,**

*Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.*

[FR Doc. 2010-28606 Filed 11-12-10; 8:45 am]

**BILLING CODE 4910-13-P**

## DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

### Federal Aviation Administration

#### 14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2010-1113; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-121-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

#### Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) Airplanes

**AGENCY:** Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

**ACTION:** Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

**SUMMARY:** We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)

originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

During flight-testing of a wing anti-ice piccolo tube containing a deliberate small breach, it was determined that the wing leading edge thermal switches Part Number (P/N) 601R59320-1 were not detecting the consequent bleed leak at the design threshold. As a result, Airworthiness Limitation (AWL) tasks, consisting of a functional check of the wing leading edge thermal switches (P/N 601R59320-1) and an inspection of the wing anti-ice duct piccolo tubes on aeroplanes with these switches installed, have been introduced. These tasks will limit exposure to dormant failure of the wing leading edge thermal switches in the event of piccolo tube failure, which could potentially compromise the structural integrity of the wing leading edge and the effectiveness of the wing anti-ice system.

\* \* \* \* \*

The unsafe condition is loss of control of the airplane. The proposed AD would require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

**DATES:** We must receive comments on this proposed AD by December 30, 2010.

**ADDRESSES:** You may send comments by any of the following methods:

- **Federal eRulemaking Portal:** Go to <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
- **Fax:** (202) 493-2251.
- **Mail:** U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
- **Hand Delivery:** U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact Bombardier, Inc., 400 Côte-Vertu Road West, Dorval, Québec H4S 1Y9, Canada; telephone 514-855-5000; fax 514-855-7401; e-mail: [thd.crj@aero.bombardier.com](mailto:thd.crj@aero.bombardier.com); Internet <http://www.bombardier.com>. You may review copies of the referenced service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

#### Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at <http://www.regulations.gov>; or in person at the

Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the **ADDRESSES** section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

#### FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Cesar Gomez, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe and Mechanical Systems Branch, ANE-171, FAA, New York Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410, Westbury, New York 11590; telephone (516) 228-7318; fax (516) 794-5531.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

##### Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include "Docket No. FAA-2010-1113; Directorate Identifier 2010-NM-121-AD" at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this proposed AD based on those comments.

We have lengthened the 30-day comment period for proposed ADs that address MCAI originated by aviation authorities of other countries to provide adequate time for interested parties to submit comments. The comment period for these proposed ADs is now typically 45 days, which is consistent with the comment period for domestic transport ADs.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this proposed AD.

#### Discussion

The Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), which is the aviation authority for Canada, has issued Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2010-12, dated May 26, 2010 (referred to after this as "the MCAI"), to correct an unsafe condition for the specified products. The MCAI states:

During flight-testing of a wing anti-ice piccolo tube containing a deliberate small breach, it was determined that the wing leading edge thermal switches Part Number